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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20010988-CA 
vs. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a sentence for attempted joyriding with intent to 
temporarily deprive owner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-U-1314 (1997) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1973), in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant invite any error when he voluntarily declared his obligation 
and agreement to pay restitution? 
1 
Review does not lie when a party, through counsel, has led the trial court into 
error. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989). Therefore, no standard of 
review applies. 
2. At resentencing, may a trial court order restitution not included in the 
original sentence where (a) the original sentence was illegal and therefore void and 
(b) the restitution is based on facts not known to the trial court when the original 
sentence was imposed? 
This is a legal question, reviewable for correctness. See State v. Babbel, 813 
P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991); State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, ^ 11, 997 P.2d 
314, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-405 (1997), and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2000, defendant was charged with unlawful control over a motor 
vehicle with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (1997). R. 2-3. On 
August 8 defendant pled guilty to attempted unlawful control over a motor vehicle, 
a class A misdemeanor. R. 63:5. The trial judge accepted defendant's plea, 
2 
released him to pretrial services, told him to make an appointment with Adult 
Probation and Parole for preparation of a presentence report (PSI), and notified him 
of his September 22, 2000 sentencing hearing. R. 63:5, 7-8. 
Defendant failed to appear for either preparation of his PSI or sentencing. 
R. 41, 64:2. At sentencing, the court found that defendant had voluntarily failed to 
appear and sentenced him in absentia to the statutory one-year indeterminate term. 
R. 64:2. The court also imposed a $2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorneys' fees. R. 
43. The court did not order restitution. See R. 42-43, 64. 
Defense counsel timely appealed defendant's conviction. R. 47. Despite 
defendant's status as a fugitive when the appeal was briefed and argued, this Court 
vacated his sentence, holding that defendant's sentence was an illegal sentence 
under rule 22(e), subject to correction at any time. R. 92 (State v. Samora, 2001 
UT App 266) (addendum B). 
Pursuant to the this Court's mandate, the trial court resentenced defendant. 
R. 94-95. Defendant, who had been booked on his outstanding warrant in May, 
2001, was present. R. 65, 94. Defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor all 
agreed that defendant owed restitution and had agreed to pay it as part of the 
negotiations in this case. R. 122:3-4. The victim stated that her losses were 
$744.80, but defense counsel and defendant both indicated that defendant had 
agreed to a higher amount R. 122:4, 6. 
3 
The trial court imposed a new sentence. R. 94-95. The court sentenced 
defendant to a one-year jail term and gave him good-time credit for the time he had 
served awaiting the original disposition.1 Id. The court also imposed a $2500 fine, 
a surcharge, and attorneys' fees. Id. The court further ordered that defendant pay 
$744.80 in restitution. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was drinking at his 
girlfriend's home, became angry, and drove away in her car without her permission. 
R. 3. Defendant's relative telephoned the following day and gave the girlfriend the 
vehicle's location. Id. She then retrieved the vehicle. Id. 
According to testimony given at re-sentencing, defendant destroyed a fence 
while driving the vehicle. R. 122:6. Collection proceedings for the value of the 
fence had been initiated against defendant's girlfriend, affecting her credit rating. 
Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly imposed restitution at re-
sentencing where restitution was not imposed as part of the sentence defendant 
defendant was not given credit for time spent in jail following his arrest on the 
warrant that issued when he failed to appear for his original sentencing. R. 122:8-9. The 
trial court subsequently filed an "order granting credit for time served nunc pro tunc," 
ordering that defendant receive credit for all time served prior to re-sentencing 
(unpaginated record entry filed February 4, 2002). 
4 
successfully challenged on appeal. Although a sentence imposed following the 
appeal of a prior sentence may generally be no more severe than the original 
sentence, defendant's challenge in the instant case fails for three reasons: 
(1) Defendant invited any error. Defendant raised the issue of restitution at 
resentencing and voluntarily declared his restitution obligations. 
(2) Defendant's original sentence was declared illegal. An illegal sentence is 
void and provides no legal rights. A new sentence imposed following the vacation 
of an illegal sentence may therefore be harsher than the original sentence. 
(3) Defendant's new sentence was based on facts not known to the court at 
the time of the original sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR WHEN HE VOLUNTARILY 
DECLARED HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY RESTITUTION 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by imposing a 
harsher sentence after defendant's original sentence was vacated on appeal. Br. 
Aplt. at 2. Plain error, however, does not lie where defendant has led the trial court 
into error. 
The plain error doctrine permits an appellant to claim error on appeal when he 
did not timely object below. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State 
v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). The plain error doctrine "exists to 
5 
permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from harm 
that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
159 (Utah 1989). 
Plain error review, however, does not lie when a party, through counsel, 
consciously refrains from objecting or has led the trial court into error. Id. at 158; 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. Review does not lie where counsel, "rather than merely 
remaining] silent," makes "active representations] to the court," suggesting that he 
has no objection and "leading the trial court to believe that nothing [i]s wrong" with 
its disposition of a matter. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991) 
(rejecting manifest injustice exception where counsel led court to believe jury 
instructions were proper). "[W]here invited error butts up against manifest injustice 
[or plain error], the invited error rule prevails." Id. Otherwise, a criminal 
defendant could "invite" prejudicial error and "implant it in the record as a form of 
appellate insurance " State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). 
Here, defendant and defense counsel participated in discussions regarding 
restitution. Defendant and defense counsel not only failed to object to restitution, 
but raised the issue and agreed that restitution was owing. See R. 122:3-4. Defense 
counsel raised the issue, volunteering that "[t]here is some restitution owing that 
was part of the negotiation in this case to the victim." Id. Defense counsel 
suggested that defendant and the victim had "arrive[d] at a restitution figure" of 
6 
"[a]bout $900." R. 122:4. Defendant then stated that it "[m]ight be a little higher." 
Id. The victim later declared that she only wanted defendant to pay a $744.80 bill 
for the damaged fence. Id. at 6. 
While defendant also asked that the court reduce his fine, he did not indicate 
that his agreement to pay restitution was conditioned on a reduction of his fine. Id. 
at 4. Defendant suggests in his brief that defense counsel requested "that the fine 
be waived and that instead, the trial judge impose restitution which Mr. Samora had 
agreed to pay as part of the plea negotiations." Br. Aplt. at 5. Defendant reads the 
"instead" language into the record. While defendant may have hoped for a 
reduction in his fine, nothing in the record suggests that defendant insisted on any 
quid pro quo when he voluntarily acknowledged his restitution obligation. Defense 
counsel merely stated: 
[I]t would be my request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do 
a couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the fine. There is 
some restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in this case to the 
victim. They've—Mr. Samora and the victim in this case had a fairly 
long-term relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of 
the negotiation, he's to pay some restitution with respect to that. 
We'd ask the Court to—to waive or at least to reduce the fine 
substantially and—and ask that the Court give him credit for time served 
on this case. 
R. 122:3-4. Further, defendant did not object when the court fixed his sentence, 
both reimposing his original fine and ordering restitution. Id. at 8. 
7 
Defendant thus led the court into the error he alleges on appeal. He cannot 
now claim that the trial court plainly erred by imposing restitution that defendant, 
both personally and through counsel, indicated was due. 
II. 
A TRIAL COURT MAY PROPERLY ORDER RESTITUTION NOT 
INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WHERE (A) THE 
ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS ILLEGAL AND THEREFORE VOID 
AND (B) THE RESTITUTION IS BASED ON FACTS NOT KNOWN 
TO THE TRIAL COURT WHEN THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS 
IMPOSED 
A. Because an illegal sentence is void, subsequent imposition of a more severe 
sentence is permissible. 
Defendant claims that the trial judge erred by imposing a harsher sentence 
following reversal on appeal. As a general rule, a new sentence, imposed following 
vacation of an original sentence on direct review, may not be more severe than the 
prior sentence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-405 (1997); State v. Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45, % 73, 979 P.2d 799; State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981). 
This rule is inapplicable, however, where a court rules that the original 
sentence was an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. An illegal sentence is void. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (1991) 
(correcting sentence where trial court imposed indeterminate prison terms 
potentially shorter than minimum mandatory terms required by statute). Because it 
is void, "it create[s] no rights and neither impair[s] nor affect[s] any right." Id. 
Although a reviewing court may vacate an illegal sentence in the context of an 
8 
appeal, vacation of the sentence in that context does not invoke the "no harsher 
sentence" rule. Id. Rather, the reviewing court "simply recognize[s] in effect the 
clear power of the trial court to correct an illegal sentence, irrespective of the 
appeal." Id. It recognizes the trial court's power to vacate an illegal sentence 
"whether before or after an appeal, and even if there is no appeal." Id. 
Utah law follows the rule of most jurisdictions "that an unlawful sentence is of 
no legal effect, allowing the court to correct the sentence by imposing lawful terms 
at any time the illegality is discovered, regardless of whether the correction involves 
an increase . . . ." Id. Because "[t]he correction of an illegal sentence stands on a 
different footing from the correction of an error in a conviction," "the principles 
underlying Sorenson . . . and § 76-3-405 have no application." Id. 
Defendant argued in the context of his first appeal that his sentence was 
illegal.2 This Court agreed, determining that defendant's sentence was an illegal 
sentence under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Samora, 2001 UT 
App 266, text and n.l. This determination is res judicata. See State v. Clark, 913 
2See Br. Aplt at 4 (State v. Samora, Case No. 20000884-CA); Defendant's Motion 
to Submit for Decision and Vacate Sentence, filed September 6, 2001 (Samora, Case No. 
20000884-CA). 
The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the cited documents. See 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Ut. App. 1989) (court "may take judicial notice of the 
records and prior proceedings in the same case"); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,456 & n.4 (Ut. App. 1988) (appellate court may take judicial 
notice to affirm). 
9 
P.2d 360, 362-363 (Utah App. 1996) (resolution of appeal regarding illegality of a 
sentence "is res judicata with respect to a subsequent appeal on the same issue"). 
In sum, because an illegal sentence is void and confers no rights, a corrected 
sentence may be imposed even if it is harsher than a previously imposed illegal 
sentence. A prior adjudication by this court holds that defendant's previous 
sentence was illegal. The trial court therefore did not violate defendant's rights 
when it imposed a valid sentence, even though the valid sentence was harsher than 
defendant's previous illegal sentence. 
B. In any event, the "no harsher sentence" rule does not apply where the increased 
sentence is based on facts not known to the court at the time of the original 
sentence. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-405 (1997) provides: 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court 
at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the 
record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence; or . . . . 
In other words, where new information relevant to sentencing comes to the attention 
of the trial court prior to re-sentencing and where that information is made part of 
10 
the record, a trial court can properly base its sentence on such information, even if 
the resulting sentence is more severe than a sentence set aside on appeal. 
The exception codified in subsection (2)(a) comports with the demands of due 
process. "[D]ue process of law requires that a defendant be freed from the 
apprehension that if he appeals his conviction successfully and is then convicted at 
a second trial the trial judge can retaliate by giving him an increased sentence." 
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969)). Where "the record contains no reason for the increased 
sentence, it is . . . contrary to the due process requirement articulated in North 
Carolina v. Pearce" Id. at 181. Where, however, the record contains the reasons 
for an increased sentence and the reasons are not retaliatory, no due process 
violation occurs. 
Assuming arguendo that the sentence in this case is subject to the "no harsher 
sentence" rule, it nonetheless falls within the exception articulated in subsection (2)(a). 
When the trial court sentenced defendant in absentia, the court did not know that 
defendant had damaged a fence, did not know the extent of the damages, and did 
not know that defendant had agreed to make restitution of $900 or more.3 
3Some discussion of defendant's obligation to pay restitution did occur at his 
change of plea hearing. See R. 63:3. Defendant apparently agreed, as part of his plea, 
that he would pay some restitution. See id. at 2-6. Following the plea hearing, the case 
was transferred to a different judge for sentencing. See id. at 8. No PSI had been 
prepared, neither counsel referred to defendant's earlier agreement to pay restitution, and 
(continued...) 
11 
R. 122:4, 6. After defendant raised the issue of restitution and declared his 
obligation, the trial court affirmatively solicited testimony about the restitution 
negotiations and the appropriate restitution figure. Id. at 4. The trial court thus met 
its obligation to "place[] on the record the facts which provide the basis for the 
increased sentence." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-405(2)(a). 
Further, because the increased sentence was based on facts that were not 
known to the court at the time of the original sentence, the increase had a 
permissible, non-retaliatory basis. The increase therefore did not violate due 
process. 
In sum, the restitution order here was based on facts not known to the trial 
court at the time of sentencing. The court placed on the record the facts that 
provided the basis for the increased sentence. The restitution order, while not part 
of the original sentence, was therefore proper. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's sentence imposed at re-sentencing, 
including its restitution order. 
3(...continued) 
no transcript of the plea hearing was available when sentencing was held. See R. 64. The 
sentencing judge therefore imposed sentence without knowledge that the defendant had 
caused damages or agreed to make restitution for them, much less that he had agreed to a 
figure of $900 or more. 
12 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on May J£_, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
£.U 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence set aside. 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the 
same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court at the time of the 
original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the basis 
for the increased sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later successfully moves to 
invalidate his conviction, in which case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position 
as though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred. 
Amended by Chapter 291, 1997 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_03033.ZIP 2,078 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this Title|AH Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, July 12, 2001 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and 
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for 
defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall 
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender 
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), 
the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
Addendum B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Manuel Ernesto Samora, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000884-CA 
F I L E D 
September 7, 2001 
|l 2001 UT App 266 \\ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: 
Joan C. Watt and John K. West, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Jeanne B. Inouye, and Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Joyriding, a class A 
misdemeanor. 
The issues raised in Samora's appeal are the same issues determined in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 
428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, regarding sentencing in absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(a) and Due Process rights. Accordingly, Samora is entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik 
because the district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Samora's 
absence before proceeding to sentence him in absentia; (2) provide Samora the opportunity to present 
information through counsel in mitigation of punishment and also provide the prosecutor an opportunity to 
present information relevant to sentencing; and (3) base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information regarding the crime, defendant's background, and the interests of society. See id. at fflj36-38. 
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal 
defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the 
jurisdiction and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by reinstatement. See, e.g.. State v. 
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). Because Wanosik is dispositive of Samora's appeal and requires a 
remand for resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal/1 > However, if Samora appeals the sentence 
imposed after remand, the State may raise the dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal. 
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Wanosik. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Samora could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22 
(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct... a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also Wanosik, 241 UT App 241 at n. 11 (stating 
issues regarding illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal 
under Rule 22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal from the sentence and preserve the 



























^ D J M J T R I C T COU 
^TmrCT Judicial Distric 
By. 
i tri  
NOV 2 9 2001 
SALT L^KE COUNTY 
Deputy 
Case No- 001906887 
SENTENCING 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-O0O-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 16th day of 
November, 2001, commencing at the hour of 9:54 a.m., the 
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JOHN K. WEST 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Associat ion 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Sa l t La«Blfifeyir\Utah 84111 
"FI££D' 
W«h Court of Appeals 
JAN 1 S 2002 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN p SMITHTCSR P*ukte Stagg 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-ofilerfc Of t h e C O U H 
SALT LAKE CITY! UTAH 84107 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
A +* ^ * sin (S&S) H 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. WEST: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MR. WEST: Can we do the sentencing on Manuel 
Samora? That's No. 18. 
THE COURT: Very well. . 
Mr. West, you are appearing on behalf of Mr. 
Samora? 
MR. WEST: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is Case No.—State vs. Manuel 
Ernesto Samora, Case No. CR00887. 
And for the State, Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And are you Manuel Ernest Samora? 
MR. SAMORA: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And your lawyer is Mr. West; is 
that correct? 
MR. SAMORA: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: For the record, this matter's on 
the calendar for a re-sentencing. I had sentenced Mr. 
Samora in absentia and that was on the 22nd of September, 
We now have Mr. Samora back with us and I'm bound to 
inquire, Mr. West, before we proceed with the sentencing 





 ' MR. WEST: Yes, your Honor, I— 
2
 | THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEST: — I do. 
Mr. Samora has had some time to reflect and— 
5 and it's going to be his request today that the Court go 
® ahead and impose the year. He would like to have a clean 
7 break, get this done, get a new start on life. He would, 
8 I however, if I may approach? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. WEST: He would like the Court to be aware 
of some of the things that he's been doing while he's 
been incarcerated. He served two months in jail before 
he was sentenced originally on this case and then he 
14
 | served an additional approximately four months, I think, 
15 i since— 
16
 I MR. SAMORA: Six. Six months, 
17 I MR. WEST: Six months. And it would be— 
THE COURT: While you were pursuing the appeal? 
MR. WEST: Yes, your Honor. 
20 I THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I mean, the point is, 
21 i guess, made. 
22 MR. WEST: It—it would be a—it would be my 
23 request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a 
24 couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the 








the negotiation in this case to the victim. They've—Mr. 
* Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-term 
w
 relationship before this all happened and there was, as a 
4
 part of the negotiation, he's to pay some restitution 
5
 with respect to that. 
* We'd ask the Court to—to waive or at least to 
^ reduce the fine substantially and—and ask that the Court 
® give him credit for time served on this case. 
9
 J THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. West. 
And did Mr. Samora and the victim arrive at a 
restitution figure that they've agreed upon, keeping in 
mind that I don't have a pre-sentence report or have any 
input into this. 
14 MR. WEST: Your Honor, I think the State has 
15




 MR. WEST: About $900, I think. 
18
 MR. SAMORA: Might be a little higher. 
19
 THE COURT: Mr. Samora, before I decide what's 
20 to be done here, do you have anything to say? 
21 MR. SAMORA: Yeah, your Honor. I've had a lot 
22 of time to think of what has happened and what I've done, 
23 I do have remorse for what I've done. I just want to sey 
24 I'm sorry to the Court for taking their time and to 






 I the right track and get started with my life again, your 
2
 I Honor. 
3
 THE COURT: And you opted, though, not to 
4
 participate in the pre-sentence report. 
5 MR. WEST: Your Honor, I think the reason for 
® that was when—when they came out, they gave him a packet 
7 and I had told him that I would come out and help him, 
® you know, fill out the questionnaire. And it was some 
9 I time before I got out there and they—they came back and 
he had indicated to the agent from Adult Probation & 
Parole that since he had already done a large chunk of 




13 J the remaining portion of that year. Hopefully he'll be 
14 I able to get some good time credit for that and then just 
15 have a fresh start so that he can get out, get to work, 
16 pay off the restitution and—and get on with his life. 
17 THE COURT: Does the State have a 
18 recommendation, Mr. Esqueda? 
19 MR. ESQUEDA: Before we get to our 
20 recommendation, the victim, Kelly Johnson, wishes to 
21 address the Court. 
22 THE COURT: Oh, 
23 Mr. West, you and Mr. Samora stand over here. 
24 Yes, ma'am. Come forward. If you wish to say 




 MS. JOHNSON: The only thing I'm asking for is 
^ that he pay for the fence that he destroyed when he was 
3 driving my vehicle, 'cause they're coming after me, it's 
* gone to collections, it's affecting my credit and he had 
5 agreed to pay it last year, in October, that was a 
® condition of his release. And I have that in the 
7
 transcripts right here. 
8 He has—we've been unable to come to an 
9 I understanding. The—the amount is 744.80 and that's all 
I want, I just want him to pay the bill. I—I don't want 
anything more than that because they're coming after me. 
12 They're saying that they're coming after me because it 
13 was my vehicle. He had it at the time, I wasn't even in 
14 town when the accident happened. I just want the bill 
15 paid because they're coming after me. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ma'am. 
17 MS. JOHNSON: That's all. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: You bet. 
19 MR. WEST: And your Honor, just as 
20 clarification, I think that is the amount we're talking 
21 about because there wasn't any restitution really 
22 involved with this particular incident, but we agreed as 
23 part of the plea that he would make that restitution. 
24 MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, considering we don't 
25 have a pre-sentence report and that strikes me as odd, 
10 
11 
and looking at his history, at least from the rap sheet, 
* he has a history that begins back in 1979 and—and goes 
through the history of his case; several intoxications, 
4
 batteries, protective order violations, DUIs, his 
5 history's atrocious. 
® THE COURT: That may be why we don't have a 
7 report, Counsel. 
8 MR. ESQUEDA: Could be. Could be, Judge. 
® I In any event, I think just to grant him credit 
for time served and close this case out is inappropriate. 
MR. WEST: That's not what we're asking for. 
12
 MR. ESQUEDA: (Inaudible) 
13 MR. WEST: Mr. Samora is willing to do the year 
14
 in time but I think he's entitled to the credit for the 
15
 time that he has done. 
16 MR. ESQUEDA: In essence, that's exactly what's 
1? happening. If I—if I could speak without being 
18 interrupted. 
19 In essence, if you give him the time served 
20 that he has, he—he has little time to serve at all on 
21 this case. And he's kind of avoided responsibility. 
22 He's put the victim in a situation where her—her credit 
23 is ruined, she has people suing her for his acts. Now-, 
24 how that's happening and I've talked to Ms. Johnson about 
25 that, what kind of things she can do to protect herself; 
10 
1
 but he is yet to take responsibility for affecting her 
2
 life the way he has. 
3 Sof I'm not sure he's entitled to any credit 
4
 for time served and that's our position, Judge. 
5
 THE COURT: All right. There being no legal 
® reason why I should not impose sentence, I will do so at 
7
 this time, Mr. Samora. 
® It is the judgment and sentence of this Court 
9 I that you serve the term provided by law in the Adult 
Detention Center of one year for the Class A misdemeanor 
11
 crime to which you have pled guilty. 
12
 I will order that you pay a restitution amount 
13 in—of 744.80. That you pay a recoupment fee for the use 
1* of your publicly-provided lawyer of $500, which ought to 




 I will order, moreover, you pay a fine in the 
18 amount of $2,500 plus an 85 percent surcharge on that 
19 fine. 
20 I will grant you credit for any time served 
21 prior to the disposition in this matter, that is, prior 
22 to the arrest on the most recent warrant for failing to 
23 appear. The time you've served on the warrant that wa^, 
24 issued for your arrest based upon failure to appear, in 
25 my judgment, is not good time, and therefore, you're not 
8 
10 
entitled to credit for it. The time you served awaiting 
2
 disposition originally, whatever that may be, I will 
3
 grant you credit for. 
4
 Commitment is forthwith. 
5
 MR. WEST: So—so he doesn't get credit for any 
® of the time that he's served since he was picked up on 
7 the warrant, your Honor? 
8
 THE COURT: Right. That's my order. 
9 I Good luck to you. 
MR. SAMORA: Could I speak, your Honor? 
11
 Could I speak? 
12
 J THE COURT: Yeah. I think you probably ought 
to talk to your lawyer first. 
14
 | (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
15 
16 | * * * 
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20 
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